A view growing in popularity in the current philosophical literature is that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag good informants. Such a thesis has its origin in the work of Bernard Williams and Edward Craig. Williams, for instance, claims that the central point of the concept of knowledge is "to find somebody who is a source of reliable information about something" (1973, p. 146). And Craig maintains that knowledge ascriptions are made so as to "flag approved sources of information" (Craig 1990, p. 
credit for success because there was no success-S's belief is false. In other cases we deny credit because success was realized, but not through ability-S believes the truth but it was a lucky guess, or there was faulty reasoning. (Greco 2007, p. 57) 1 Likewise, Ram Neta writes: Craig (1990) articulates and defends a plausible account of our practice of attributing knowledge, and I propose that we extend his theory to epistemological status generally….
To state Craig's hypothesis…precisely…: the concept of knowledge is designed to flag sources of information that acquire their information in a way that we can tell is a reliable way of acquiring information, and that can take the credit for acquiring their information in this way. Let's sum this up by saying that the concept of knowledge is designed to flag 'creditable informants'. I propose to generalize Craig's hypothesis by claiming that the various terms of epistemological appraisal are designed to flag informants that are creditable to various levels, or in various ways. (Neta 2006, pp. 266-7) 2 According to Neta, such a generalization of Craig's view can explain (1) why the practice of assertion is governed by epistemological norms, (2) what the proper targets of epistemological assessment are, (3) what makes epistemological norms binding on epistemic agents, and (4) why the dispute between internalists and externalists in epistemology is so hardy and intractable. (Neta 2006, pp. 268-70) Though there are some obvious differences among what these theorists endorse, they all agree both in their acceptance of the RIVKA-the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag reliable 3 informants-and in their conclusion that such a view has enormous epistemological significance. 4 One feature of our knowledge ascriptions 5 that is of interest here is that knowledge is attributed, not only to individuals, but to groups as well. Just as I may say that my daughter knows that my birthday is in September, so, too, I may claim that Borders knows that it is losing the battle over the e-book market with Barnes & Noble or that the Supreme Court knows the repercussions of its recent decision. This phenomenon has frequently been noted in the literature on group knowledge and belief. For instance, Alvin Goldman writes: "In common parlance, certainly, organizations are treated as subjects for knowledge attribution. In the wake of 9/11, there has been much commentary on what the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. did or didn't know about terrorist plans before the event itself" (Goldman 2004, p. 12) . Similarly, in arguing for the existence of group belief, Frederick F. Schmitt asks us to " [b] egin with the observation that we routinely ascribe knowledge …to groups. We say things such as, 'The Engineering Division of the Ford Motor Corporation knew that the Pinto was explosive," [etc.]…. These are, on the face of it, ascriptions of cognitive states to groups" (Schmitt 1994, pp. 257-8) . 6 A common theme running through these passages is that we do in fact attribute knowledge to groups and that we do so systematically and in a widespread fashion. This observation-that knowledge is attributed to groups as well as to individuals-can be combined with the RIVKA, resulting in the following group version of the view:
G-RIVKA: The purpose of group knowledge attributions is to identify or flag reliable informants.
Since ascribing knowledge to groups is no less an attribution of knowledge than it is in the individual case, there is no reason for the proponent of the RIVKA to object to the formulation of this thesis in terms of groups. Indeed, were the G-RIVKA denied without substantial argumentation, the result would be that we can simply pick and choose which knowledge attributions to take seriously.
Whenever a counterexample involving a knowledge attribution is raised to one's view, one could simply respond, "well, that's just one of those knowledge attributions that we aren't taking seriously." This arbitrary reliance on the linguistic data would seriously undermine the substantive 4 philosophical conclusions purportedly derived from them. Given the obvious unattractiveness of this result, combined with the fact that there are no arguments in the literature against the propriety of ascribing knowledge to groups, there is no reason to accept the RIVKA without also granting the G-RIVKA.
Further evidence for this conclusion comes from noticing that group knowledge attributions are made systematically and in a widespread fashion in contexts where there is a heightened concern for speaking precisely. Consider, for example, the following ascription taken from a recent article in the Los Angeles Times: "BP officials knew about a problem on a crucial well safety device at least three months before the catastrophic April 20 explosion in the Gulf of Mexico but failed to repair it" (Los Angeles Times, July 21, 2010 ). This attribution of knowledge to BP is regarded as proper not only when made in the Los Angeles Times, but also if it were later offered in a courtroom setting where critical issues of moral and legal responsibility are being debated. No one reading the newspaper or sitting in the courtroom would regard the attribution as merely metaphorical or as an exaggeration, as is the case when one says, "The injured mouse just sat there as I approached him-it was as if he knew that I was going to help him," or "The wind blew the stick precisely to mark our location-it seemed to know that we needed to be rescued." In these latter cases, there wouldn't be a debate over whether the mouse or the wind really knew the propositions being attributed to them; instead, one would simply retract the knowledge attributions if challenged to be precise or careful. But clearly the situation is quite different in the case of claiming that BP knew about the faulty safety device, where such ascriptions would hold even in contexts where journalistic and legal standards call for precision and care. In what follows, then, I will assume that there are some group knowledge attributions that are proper, and I will focus on paradigmatic cases where knowledge is widely and systematically attributed to groups across a wide range of contexts as instances of them.
With this is mind, I will argue in this paper that the G-RIVKA, and therefore the RIVKA, is false. In particular, I will consider three different kinds of paradigmatic group knowledge attributions and show that on any reading of "reliable informant," such attributions systematically fail to identify or flag reliable informants. There are two natural responses that may be offered to my arguments. First, it may be claimed that an inflationary account of group attitudes can avoid the problems raised against the G-RIVKA and, second, it may be held that the RIVKA should be restricted only to individuals. Along the way, I will raise considerations that block each of these moves. Specifically, I will show that there are reasons to reject an inflationary account of group attitudes and also that there are problematic cases for the RIVKA involving only individual knowledge attributions. Finally, I will propose alternatives to both the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA, which I call the Reliable Source of Information View of Knowledge Attributions-the RSIVKA-and its group counterpart-the G-RSIVKA-according to which a central purpose of knowledge attributions, individual or group, is to identify or flag reliable sources of information. These replacement theses provide conditions that are neither strictly necessary nor sufficient for proper knowledge attributions, but they purport to capture what is broadly defensible in spirit about the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA.
Reliable Informants as Reliable Believers
To begin, it will be helpful to get a clearer sense of what is meant by a reliable informant. Since
Craig provides the most explicit and detailed account of this concept, his work is a natural place to start. The first condition that he offers, which is necessary, though not sufficient, for being a reliable informant, is characterized as follows:
BELIEF: A is a reliable informant with respect to the question whether p only if either p and A believes that p, or not-p and A believes that not-p. (Craig 1990, p. 12) 6 According to Craig, a person seeking a good informant wants someone "who will tell him the truth on [a given question]. The informant, we may assume, will not in general tell him the truth unless he (the informant) holds a true belief about it" (Craig 1990, p. 12) . Given this, combined with the RIVKA, it follows that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag informants who at least either believe that p when p is the case, or believe that not-p when not-p is the case. For ease of expression, let us say that according to BELIEF, reliable informants are understood as reliable believers. Thus, the G-RIVKA plus BELIEF yields the view that the purpose of group knowledge attributions is to identify or flag informants who are at least reliable believers.
Since we cannot determine whether a group is a reliable believer without knowing what group belief is, the next question to which we should turn is how to understand this concept. A standard view of group belief is summative, according to which a group's believing that p can be understood in the minimal sense that all or some of the members of the group believe that p.
Anthony Quinton (1975 Quinton ( /1976 ) is responsible for coining this term and he defends a summative view of group attitudes and actions in general in the following passage:
We do, of course, speak freely of the mental properties and acts of a group in the way we do of individual people. Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions, and attitudes and to take decisions and make promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates to its members. With such mental states as beliefs and attitudes, the ascriptions are of what I have called a summative kind. To say that the industrial working class is determined to resist anti-trade union laws is to say that all or most industrial workers are so minded. (Quinton 1975 (Quinton /1976 7
Summative accounts of group belief also result from widely used aggregation procedures for combining individual beliefs held by the members of a group into collective ones. "Aggregation 7 procedures are mechanisms a multimember group can use to combine ('aggregate') the individual beliefs or judgments held by the group members into collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole" (List 2005, p. 25) . 8 For instance, a dictatorial procedure, "whereby the collective judgments are always those of some antecedently fixed group member (the 'dictator')" (List 2005, p. 28) reduces the belief of the group to the judgment of a single member-the dictator. A majority procedure, "whereby a group judges a given proposition to be true whenever a majority of group members judges it to be true," reduces the belief of the group to a majority of its individual members (List 2005, p. 27) . A supermajority procedure, whereby a group judges a given proposition to be true whenever a supermajority of group members judges it to be true, reduces the belief of the group to a supermajority of its individual members. And a unanimity procedure, "whereby the group makes a judgment on a proposition if and only if the group members unanimously endorse that judgment," (List 2005, p. 30) reduces the belief of the group to all of its members when there is unanimous agreement. Though there are obvious differences between the reductive bases on such views, they are all summative: the beliefs of the group are reducible to the beliefs of all or some of the members that comprise it Summative accounts of group belief are not only widely endorsed theoretically, they are also most in keeping with ordinary intuitions regarding such a notion. Margaret Gilbert makes this point when she writes:
What is it for us to believe that such-and-such, according to our everyday understanding? It is common to answer this question with some form of 'summative' account. For us to believe that p is for all or most of us to believe that p. Or perhaps a 'common knowledge' condition may be added: for us to believe that p is for all or most of us to believe that p, while this is common knowledge among us. Whatever the precise account given, the core of it is a number of individuals who personally believe that p. (Gilbert 1994, p. 235) While Pettit takes this argument as revealing why a summative account of group belief is untenable, we can also use it here to show the falsity of the G-RIVKA when group belief is understood summatively. For in JUDGMENT AGGREGATION, there is no reason to suppose that only mere judgment can be attributed to the group. We can assume that it is in fact true that the pay sacrifice is in the employees' best interest, that all of the "Yes" votes are well-grounded, reliably produced, and so on, and that the employees are not in a Gettier-type situation. In such a case, knowledge of this proposition may be attributed to the group just as judgment is. The result is that there is the attribution of knowledge that p to a group, despite the fact that not a single member of the group believes that p, reliably or otherwise. Hence, such an attribution simply cannot be flagging a reliable believer when group belief is understood summatively.
The second kind of problem case for this sort of "summative group belief" reading of the G-RIVKA arises when group knowledge is determined by the decision-making power of a group as it establishes its "official position." Consider the following: knowledge attributions regarding the lack of a causal connection between the vaccine and autism will abound. Once again, then, there will be the attribution of knowledge that p to a group when not a single member of the group reliably believes that p, and thus such an attribution cannot be flagging a reliable group believer in a summative sense. 13 The upshot of these considerations is that if the purpose of knowledge attributions is to flag reliable informants, where this latter concept is understood in terms of summatively characterized reliable group believers, then group knowledge attributions pose an obstacle to this view. For if knowledge that p is attributed to a group where not a single member of this group believes that p, and group belief is understood summatively, then this attribution cannot be flagging an informant who at least either believes that p when p is the case, or believes that not-p when not-p is the case.
The obvious move for the proponent of the G-RIVKA to make at this point, then, is to argue on behalf of a non-summative, inflationary account of group belief, according to which group belief is irreducible to the beliefs of all or some of its members. In particular, such a view holds that 11 in some very important sense, the group itself is the subject of the belief, where this is understood as over and above, or otherwise distinct from, the beliefs of any of its individual members. Such an inflationary account of group belief not only has the advantage of supporting the interpretation of G-RIVKA in terms of BELIEF, it also explains our knowledge attributions to groups in the cases described earlier.
The most widely accepted non-summative view of group belief is what we may call the joint acceptance account, a prominent expression of which is offered by Gilbert in the following passage:
A group G believes that p if and only if the members of G jointly accept that p.
The members of G jointly accept that p if and only if it is common knowledge in G that the members of G individually have intentionally and openly…expressed their willingness jointly to accept that p with the other members of G. (Gilbert 1989, p. 306) A key aspect of such an account is that joint acceptance does not require belief on the part of a single member of the group in question. She writes:
It should be understood that: (1) Joint acceptance of a proposition p by a group whose members are X, Y, and Z, does not entail that there is some subset of the set comprising X, Y, and Z such that all the members of that subset individually believe that p. (2) One who participates in joint acceptance of p thereby accepts an obligation to do what he can to bring it about that any joint endeavors…among the members of G be conducted on the assumption that p is true. He is entitled to expect others' support in bringing this about. (3) One does not have to accept an obligation to believe or to try to believe that p. However, (4) if one does believe something that is inconsistent with p, one is required at least not to express that belief baldly. (Gilbert 1989, pp. 306-7) Thus, according to Gilbert's non-summative view, so long as a group jointly accepts that p, such a group can be said to believe that p even if not a single one of its members holds this belief.
12 account is perhaps best suited for explaining beliefs attributed to organized or established groups, such as that found in OFFICIAL POSITION. None of the doctors in the AAP believes that there is not a causal connection between the MMR and autism, but the members of the Board of Directors officially and jointly accept this conclusion on behalf of the Academy.
However, while Gilbert's account of group belief is best supported by OFFICIAL POSITION, it is not entirely clear that her view can fully accommodate even this sort of case. For though the members of the Board jointly accept the conclusion that there is not a causal connection between the MMR and autism, it is not the case that each member of the AAP engages in such joint acceptance, despite the fact that the knowledge attribution is to the Academy as a whole. This is made clear by the fact that it is quite easy to imagine many individual members of the AAP baldly expressing their dissenting beliefs to their own patients, which is in violation of (4) above. This is not an uncommon phenomenon: the Supreme Court can issue a decision as a group while individual members nonetheless issue a dissenting report; a department can officially recommend as a group that one of its members be granted tenure even though individual members openly reject this conclusion.
Moreover, the situation is far worse when JUDGMENT AGGREGATION is considered, for here there is nothing even in the neighborhood of joint acceptance by the members of the group in question. Indeed, while the premise-based aggregation procedure results in the group's judging that they should accept the pay sacrifice, the individual members unanimously and explicitly reject this conclusion. Thus, even on a widely accepted non-summative account of group belief, OFFICIAL POSITION and JUDGMENT AGGREGATION fail to deliver the verdict that reliable group believers are being identified or flagged by the knowledge attributions in question.
These objections are specific to the joint acceptance account, which is by far the most widely accepted non-summative view of group belief. But recall that Pettit uses the premise-based 13 aggregation procedure to motivate embracing such an inflationary view in JUDGMENT AGGREGATION. So, it should be noted that there is also a serious problem with grounding a non-summative view of group belief in this sort of argument. To see this, notice that there are many different aggregation procedures that may be used to generate a group belief or judgment in any given case, some of which were discussed in the previous section. What is of interest for our purposes here, however, is that there is not a fact of the matter about which aggregation procedure should be used in any given case-each has its virtues and its vices. Fabrizio Cariani begins his overview of the literature on judgment aggregation with a similar point:
Judgment Aggregation studies how collective judgments arise from the aggregation of individual opinions. Its motivating observation is that prima facie plausible rules for aggregating judgments do not (and cannot) have all the features we take to be desirable.
Judgment Aggregation, then, aims to classify the various aggregation rules by means of the properties they do satisfy and to select those that are, in some sense, best. (Cariani 2011, p. 1) 15 Given that competing aggregation procedures can result in radically different group beliefs despite holding fixed the individuals and their respective beliefs, combined with the point that there is not always a fact of the matter about which procedure to use, there also does not seem to be a fact of
the matter about what a given group's belief is in such cases. The group can be said to believe that p just as easily as it can be said to believe that not-p. Surely this conclusion provides a compelling reason to be doubtful of an inflationary account of group belief that is motivated via a premisebased aggregation procedure.
There are also concerns that can be raised with inflationary accounts of group belief in general. In particular, paradigmatic instances of group "belief" function differently in important ways than beliefs in individuals do. To see this, consider again OFFICIAL POSITION, which involves the American Academy of Pediatrics denying that there is a connection between the MMR and autism. When group belief is determined by the official position arrived at by a decision-making power, group belief is far more directly voluntary than it is in the individual case. 16 The power in question can simply decide that the official position of the group is that p, whereas individuals do not seem capable of just deciding to believe that p in this way. 17 Similarly, group belief in this sense is far less governed by evidence than it is when an individual's doxastic states are at issue. For instance, K. Brad Wray argues that groups, unlike individual agents, can choose to believe based on their goals and Christopher McMahon claims that groups often defend as true positions that they adopt for purely instrumental reasons.
ence. 20 IEF. 18 In OFFICIAL POSITION, the goal of the AAP may be to produce the best health for the greatest number of children, and so as a result the Board of Directors may choose to downplay the possibility of some children becoming autistic as a result of the MMR since the benefits of vaccines are more likely to further this broader goal. Or the AAP may adopt the position that there is no causal link between the MMR and autism in an effort to promote their positive image in the public eye. 19 Neither of these ways of "belief" formation seems available in the individual case, where doxastic attitudes are far more directly sensitive to evid These considerations provide further reason to reject appealing to an inflationary account of group belief in an effort to defend the interpretation of the G-RIVKA in terms of BEL Thus, the G-RIVKA, when understood in terms of BELIEF, is supported by neither a summative nor a non-summative account of group belief.
A proponent of the G-RIVKA may respond to this conclusion by claiming that the RIVKA should be restricted to knowledge attributions involving only individuals. In particular, it may be argued that group knowledge attributions are metaphorical, "loose talk," or are otherwise not fully legitimate and hence the G-RIVKA should be rejected from the start.
By way of response to this move, the first point to notice is that in the absence of substantial argumentation on its behalf, it is utterly arbitrary. For as was noted at the outset of this paper, the fact is that we do attribute knowledge to groups and that we do so in a widespread and systematic way. It is entirely unclear, then, why we can pick and choose which knowledge attributions should be subsumed by our general account of knowledge attributions.
Moreover, there are independent reasons-ones that do not depend on considerations about groups at all-for doubting that belief in the relevant proposition is a necessary condition for being a reliable informant with respect to the question whether p. In particular, there are cases in which a speaker fails to believe a proposition to which she is testifying, but nevertheless reliably conveys the information in question through her testimony. For instance, suppose that Stella, an elementary school teacher who is also a creationist, regards it as her pedagogical duty to present material to her students that is best supported by the available evidence, which clearly includes the truth of evolutionary theory. As a result, after consulting reliable sources in the library and developing reliable lecture notes, she asserts to her students, "Modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus," while presenting her biology lesson today. Though Stella herself neither believes nor knows this proposition, she never shares her own views with her students, and so they form the corresponding true belief solely on the basis of her reliable testimony. Now, given Stella's commitment to creationism, she does not believe that modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus. But because she reliably conveys this information to her fourth-grade students, and does not provide them with any evidence to the contrary, they acquire the knowledge in question on the basis of her testimony. What this case reveals, then, is that an unreliable believer may nonetheless be a reliable testifier, and so may reliably convey information despite the fact that she fails to believe it herself.
For although Stella ignores the relevant evidence with respect to her doxastic states concerning evolutionary theory-thereby leading her to lack the belief that modern day Homo sapiens evolved from Homo erectus-she bases her testimony regarding this topic firmly on such evidence. 21 This sort of case provides a compelling reason entirely separate from those involving groups for rejecting the view in which a reliable informant is understood in terms of BELIEF, thereby blocking the possibility of simply restricting the RIVKA to knowledge attributions involving individuals.
We have seen that when the notion of reliable informant operative in the G-RIVKA requires that the testifier believe that to which she is testifying, problems arise regarding knowledge attributions involving groups. If the G-RIVKA is to be defensible, then, we need to look beyond BELIEF for a proper characterization of the notion of a reliable informant.
Reliable Informants as Reliable Testifiers
In looking for a replacement for BELIEF to underwrite the G-RIVKA, an alternative suggestion presented itself in the previous section. Instead of focusing on reliable believers, as BELIEF does, the focus should be on reliable testifiers. This distinction is made clear in the above case, where Stella is an unreliable believer when it comes to evolutionary theory but a reliable testifier when it comes to conveying this sort of information to her students. More precisely, BELIEF should be replaced with:
TESTIMONY: A is a reliable informant with respect to the question whether p only if A is a reliable testifier with respect to whether p.
Being a reliable testifier can, in turn, be fleshed out in any number of ways. For instance, one way of understanding this reliability constraint is via Nozick's notion of sensitivity, i.e., A would not state that p if p were false. 22 Alternatively, reliability can be fleshed out in terms of the safety requirement endorsed by Pritchard, Sosa, and Williamson, i.e., A would not state that p without it being so that p. 23 Or it may be the case that general facts about A's history as a testimony-producing source or as a virtuous testifier determine whether A's statement is reliable. 24 But regardless of how the details of reliability are worked out, the central point that is of import here is that belief that p is not a necessary condition for being a reliable testifier and, thereby, a reliable informant regarding that p.
Thus, when being a reliable informant is understood in terms of TESTIMONY, the G-RIVKA amounts to the following version of this view: the purpose of group knowledge attributions is to identify or flag reliable testifiers.
As was the case with group belief, the standard view of group testimony is summative, according to which a group's testifying that p can be understood in the minimal sense that all or some members of the group would testify that p were the relevant opportunity to arise. Deborah
Tollefsen characterizes the view as follows: "…when a group offers testimony it is really understood as the testimony of all or some of the members-what they would testify to if given the opportunity.
Another way to understand this summative approach would be to say that a group's testimony p expresses the views of all or some of the members of the group" (2007, p. 300 According to the scenario envisaged above, however, not a single member of the group is privy to this information because the data upon which this conclusion is based was widely distributed among those in the group. In particular, Sam, who is not a member of the group, interprets and compiles the data contributed by the members of this group into the published report and serves as the group's spokesperson. When knowledge is attributed to the UN Population Commission, then, the G-RIVKA holds that its purpose is to identify or flag a reliable informant. But here not only is there the absence of the relevant belief on the part of the group's members, as we saw in the cases from the previous section, there is not even a reliable testifier in the group regarding the information in question. In other words, the attribution of knowledge is over here-where the group is-and the reliable testifier is over there-where the spokesperson is. Thus, DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION shows that when being a reliable testifier is understood summatively, the G-RIVKA is false. By way of response to this objection, the first point to notice is that Sam's statement that the birth rate of Latinos in the US is on the rise satisfies every existing theory of the nature of testimony offered in the literature. For instance, Elizabeth Fricker characterizes testimony as "tellings generally" with "no restrictions either on subject matter, or on the speaker's epistemic relation to it" (Fricker 1995, pp. 396-7) . Robert Audi claims that we must understand testimony as "...people's telling us things" (Audi 1997, p. 406) . Catherine Elgin characterizes testimony as "…utterances and inscriptions that purport to convey information and transmit warrant for the information they convey" (Elgin 2002, p. 292 Commission, the group's testimony cannot reduce to hers. Thus, when knowledge is attributed to the UN Population Commission, there is no relevant reliable testifier being flagged or identified when group testimony is understood in such a summative way. On an inflationary account, the testimony of a group is over and above, or otherwise distinct from, that of its members. But I know of no such inflationary account according to which the reliability of the testimony of the UN Population Commission is explained via Sam's reliability as a testifier. Instead, inflationary accounts take group testimony to issue from the group as a whole, not from a single non-member of it. Commission is aware.
As we did in the original scenario, we can assume that the statement in question is true, that the testimony is justified, and that there are no relevant Gettier considerations. In DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2, then, everything that is epistemologically relevant is identical to the situation found in DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION. Given this, if it is plausible to attribute knowledge of 26 the fact that the birth rate of Latinos is on the rise to the UN Population Commission in the latter case, it should be no less plausible in the former case. However, though Maria is the source of the testimony that the birth rate of Latinos is on the rise, there is no reasonable sense in which Maria's testimony is, or can be, the reductive base for that of the UN Population Commission. She arrived at her conclusion in a way that is causally independent from Sam's process, she is not a member of the UN Population Commission, she is not their official spokesperson, and she is not testifying on their behalf. In DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2, then, we have a case in which knowledge is properly attributed to the UN Population Commission, despite the fact that there is no sense whatsoever on any account of group testimony in which a reliable testifier has been identified or flagged.
Thus, when the notion of reliable informant is understood in terms of being a reliable testifier, DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION and DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2 show that the G-RIVKA is false. Given this, combined with the considerations from the previous section, we may need to look in an altogether different place for an account of group knowledge attributions.
Reliable Informants versus Reliable Sources of Information
One lesson that may be learned from the previous section is that there is a difference between an informant, on the one hand, and a source of information, on the other. In DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2, Maria is clearly the informant when it comes to learning that the birth rate of Latinos is on the rise. But it does not follow from this that the UN Population is not a source of this information in a broader sense. If one wished to find out whether the birth rate of Latinos is on the rise, all of the relevant data needed to arrive at this conclusion is located within the group and its members. If one had the requisite skills to compile and interpret the relevant data, one could come 27 to know this fact without the help of Maria. In this way, the UN Population Commission is clearly a source of this information, even if it is not properly regarded as an informant with respect to it.
This distinction between informant and source of information is not lost on proponents of the G-RIVKA. Indeed, Craig himself calls attention to it, though he does so specifically to tie knowledge attributions to the former and not to the latter. He writes:
There are informants, and there are sources of information. Or, to arrange the terminology differently, among the various sources of information there are on the one hand informants who give information; and on the other there are states of affairs, some of which involve states of human beings and their behaviour, which have evidential value: information can be gleaned from them. Roughly, the distinction is that between a person's telling me something and my being able to tell something from observation of him…. In general terms it can be said that the concept of knowledge, as we operate it in everyday practice, is tied to informants rather than to sources of information in the sense just…characterized. (Craig 1990, p. 35) According to Craig, then, informants are, roughly speaking, testifiers who offer reports or statements to others, while sources of information can be any states of affairs that have evidential value such that information can be gleaned from them. Now, as should be clear, I reject Craig's claim that our knowledge attributions identify or flag reliable informants rather than reliable sources of information. In DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2, our attribution of knowledge that the birth rate of Latinos is on the rise to the UN Population Commission clearly fails to identify or flag a reliable informant since not a single member of the group is privy to the relevant information.
Moreover, Maria, who is the reliable informant in this case, is not the subject of the relevant knowledge attribution. 32 So, we have a knowledge attribution without a reliable informant, and a reliable informant without a knowledge attribution. Despite this, however, the attribution of There are other sorts of cases, which do not involve groups at all, that further support these replacement theses. Such cases again block the move of simply restricting the scope of the RIVKA to individuals. To see this, consider the following:
PRE-LINGUISTIC BABY: Tommy is a fifteen-month-old pre-linguistic baby whose cognitive abilities far surpass his verbal abilities. While talking to a friend, his mother says, "Tommy knows that when I pull out the octopus sippy cup, I will fill it with his beloved 29 milk whereas when I pull out the crocodile sippy cup, I will fill it with his dreaded ear infection medicine."
Here, Tommy's mother is clearly attributing knowledge to him-namely, that he knows which sippy cup will hold which drink. At the same time, however, she does not seem to be identifying or flagging a reliable informant when she does so. Tommy is a pre-linguistic baby and so there is an obvious sense in which he is not an informant at all. In particular, because he has not mastered any meaningful words in a human language, he is not yet in the realm of being a testifier capable of offering testimony to an audience. Indeed, we can imagine that Tommy has also failed to master any non-verbal signals that are distinctively communicative. For instance, he has not yet learned to nod, point, or gesture as a means of communicating with those around him. Thus, when Tommy's mother attributes knowledge to him, it is purely on the basis of observing him and his behavior.
Perhaps he smiles and drinks voraciously upon being handed the octopus sippy cup, but frowns and turns his head away when handed the crocodile sippy cup. Regardless of the details, the point that is here relevant is that Tommy is not yet capable of being an informant, let alone a reliable one. But clearly this is not the case when he is considered as a source of information on the topic of his attitudes toward sippy cups and their contents. When his mother attributes knowledge to him, I can certainly observe his behavior just as his mother can. I can watch his reactions when different cups and liquids are within his visual field and I can draw inferences about this data. Assuming that Tommy's mother made an accurate assessment of his cognitive abilities, then, the attribution of knowledge to him clearly identifies or flags a reliable source of information. Hence, while PRE-LINGUISTIC BABY poses a problem for the RIVKA, it can easily be accommodated by the RSIVKA.
Now it should be noted that Craig is aware of this sort of problem and he responds by objectivising the concept of being a good informant. 33 In particular, he argues that in order for the concept to have value in communication, we need to subtract from it what is required for being a good informant for a particular person on a specific occasion and focus instead on the detectability of an informant's reliability in principle. Thus, so long as an informant's reliability is objectively detectable by some possible means-even if it is not detectable by the means possessed by any actual person-this will suffice for being a reliable informant in the relevant sense.
Once the notion of being a good informant is objectivised in this way, however, the concept becomes so weak that it bears little resemblance to its intuitive self. For instance, even though
Tommy is a pre-linguistic baby in the above case, we can certainly imagine a person with mindreading powers who could discern the extent to which the baby, were he capable of communicating, would be reliable as an informant. Indeed, such powers could even enable one to read off the reliability of an entirely non-linguistic, non-human animal. 34 Craig's view, then, counts as reliable informants those who currently are not informants at all-such as pre-linguistic babies-and even those who never will be informants-such as some non-human animals. This strikes me as an unwelcome consequence. Thus, it is a virtue of the RSIVKA over the RIVKA that it can accommodate cases such as PRE-LINGUISTIC BABY while altogether eliminating the need for the appeal to objectivisation.
However, replacing the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA with the RSIVKA and the G-RSIVKA will not be met with enthusiasm by all. Ram Neta, for instance, claims that Craig avoids the problem of "wrongly classif[ying] thermometers as knowers" only by arguing that knowledge attributions flag informants, not mere sources of information (Neta 2006, p. 266 Under one interpretation, the KA/KT is trivially true-to be a proper knowledge attribution just is to correctly identify a knower. But Craig and his followers intend a more substantive reading of this thesis where, instead of providing analyses of the concept of knowledge, we look at our practices and use paradigmatic attributions of knowledge as a guide to the presence of knowledge.
With this in mind, suppose that the RSIVKA, rather than the RIVKA, is true. Given this, knowledge attributions are proper when the subject of the attribution is a reliable source of information. But here is the problem: thermometers clearly can be reliable sources of information.
Thus, the RSIVKA has the consequence that the following knowledge attribution can be proper:
"The thermometer knows that it is 98 degrees outside." If this is then combined with the KA/KT, we have the following absurd result: thermometers are knowers. According to Craig and Neta, this absurdity can be avoided by rejecting the RSIVKA in favor of the RIVKA. On this view, knowledge attributions are proper when the subject of the attribution is a reliable informant. Given that thermometers are not informants, knowledge cannot be properly attributed to them. Thus, we avoid wrongly classifying thermometers as knowers.
While replacing the RSIVKA with the RIVKA is one way of avoiding the absurd result that thermometers are knowers, it is certainly not the only one. What I propose instead is that the KA/KT be modified as follows:
KA/KT*: If knowledge that p is properly attributed to S, then either S knows that p or S is a group that has members that possess epistemic properties that ground the propriety of the attribution of knowledge that p to S.
While a full discussion of the second disjunct of the above consequent lies outside the scope of this paper, let me offer a few brief remarks on its behalf. Given that all of these attributions of knowledge are proper, it follows that identifying or flagging a reliable source of information is only one of the central purposes of attributing knowledge, an emphasis that is made clear in my formulations of the RSIVKA and G-RSIVKA. Moreover, there are obviously some reliable sources of information that are not at all appropriate subjects of 34 knowledge attributions. Footprints in the sand may be a reliable source of information about who was last on the beach, but we would not be at all inclined to ascribe knowledge to such a source.
Perhaps, then, the only reliable sources of information that are here relevant are those that are subject or subject-like entities. But regardless of how the details are fleshed out, the point that is worth emphasizing is that the RSIVKA and the G-RSIVKA are meant to capture what made the RIVKA and the G-RIVKA intuitively plausible in the first place, without endorsing the overall project of the proponents of these views.
Conclusion
We have seen that paradigmatic instances of group knowledge attributions systematically fail to identify or flag reliable informants, whether this latter notion is understood in terms of being reliable believers or reliable testifiers. Since there are compelling reasons to reject an inflationary account of group attitudes and there are problematic cases for the RIVKA involving only individuals, the two most natural responses to my arguments are blocked. Thus, the G-RIVKA, and therefore the RIVKA, is false. We have also seen that these considerations pose problems for the related thesis that knowledge attributions are credit attributions since there are paradigmatic group knowledge attributions where there is no corresponding credit for the truth that is deserved. The RSIVKA and the G-RSIVKA not only avoid the problems posed by JUDGMENT AGGREGATION, OFFICIAL POSITION, DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION, and DISTRIBUTED INFORMATION2, they also accommodate cases involving pre-linguistic babies or non-linguistic animals with ease. To the extent that a central purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag anything, then, the focus should be on reliable sources of information.
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And, according to Elijah Millgram, "[Edward] Craig proposed sidestepping the exercises in conceptual analysis that still dominate epistemology by asking what function ascriptions of knowledge serve…. The need he identified was a generic and transmissible certificate for information. To say 'I know that p' conveys roughly that p is good enough to go on…." (Millgram 2009, p. 148) .
3 Reliability seems to lie at the heart of what all the quoted theorists have in mind when talking about a "good" informant. Williams and Pritchard explicitly mention reliability in the passages quoted, and Greco defends a version of agent reliabilism in the papers in which he endorses Craig's thesis. Moreover, in characterizing the notion of a good informant, Craig writes:
All of this is going to edge us towards the idea of someone who is a good informant as to whether p whatever the particular circumstances of the inquirer, whatever rewards and penalties hang over him and whatever his attitude to them. That means someone with a very high degree of reliability, someone who is very likely to be right-for he must be acceptable even to a very demanding inquirer. (Craig 1990, p. 91) .
Given this, I will focus specifically on reliable informants rather than the generic "good informant" in what follows.
4 Fricker (2007) and Kusch (2009) are also sympathetic to the general spirit of the RIVKA.
5 I shall use knowledge "attributions" and "ascriptions" interchangeably in this paper. 6 See also Hakli (2007, p. 249). 7 There are two different views of group belief suggested in this passage. On the one hand, there is the eliminativist view, according to which it is literally false that groups believe things and hence group belief attributions are simply metaphorical. On the other hand, there is the reductionist view, according to which it is literally true that groups believe things, but such claims are made true by individual members of the group believing things. The summative account, as I am understanding it in this paper, is reductionist, not eliminativist.
authority or credentials to state truly that p; and (iii) S's statement that p is believed by S to be relevant to some question that he believes is disputed or unresolved (which may or may not be whether p) and is directed at those whom he believes to be in need of evidence on the matter. (Graham 1997, p. 227) And James Ross offers a definition of testimony that bears some similarities to Graham's account. According to Ross, testimony is "...any verbalized reporting of a purported state of affairs where the reporter intends that the hearer (reader, viewer, etc.) will take it on his report that the state of affairs is as reported" (Ross 1975, p. 3) . 29 Tollefsen (2007) is an exception here since she rejects a summative account of group testimony and argues that a reductionist view in the epistemology of testimony can be applied to groups themselves. For objections to Tollefsen's arguments, see my (unpublished) . 30 See Lackey (unpublished) . 31 Of course, features of the group itself may largely determine whether the spokesperson is a reliable testifier, such as how thorough the members are in acquiring their data, how trustworthy they are in conveying it, and so on. 32 This is not to say that knowledge couldn't also be attributed to Maria. 33 See Craig (1990) . For an endorsement of this response, see Neta (2006) . 34 Additional problems have been raised to Craig's appeal to objectivisation in Schmitt (1992) . 35 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper, I am grateful to Jessica Brown, Mikkel Gerken, Sandy Goldberg, Baron Reed, and audience members at the 2010 Knowledge Ascriptions Conference at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
.
